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Abstract   This chapter concerns the normativity of the concepts of paternalism 
and libertarian paternalism. The first concept is central to evaluation of public 
health policy, but its meaning is controversial. The second concept is equally con-
troversial and has received much attention recently. It may or may not shape the 
future evaluation of public health policy. In order to facilitate honest and fruitful 
debate, I consider three conceptual approaches to these concepts, in terms of their 
normativity. Concepts, I claim, may be non-normative, normatively charged, or 
normative in that they involve more complex relationships between values or du-
ties. While the last approach is often best, other approaches may be appropriate 
depending on the context and purpose of discussion. The chapter’s conceptual in-
vestigation is illustrated in application to two public health policies – a tax on con-
sumption of fat and the encouragement of health-promoting food displays in res-
taurants and supermarkets.  
Introduction 
Few concepts are as fundamental to the evaluation of public health policy as the 
concept of paternalism. The modern welfare state as such may be seen as an in-
fringement on individual liberty from a libertarian perspective. Even the social 
liberal, however, who sees no problem in taming market forces for the good of all, 
typically finds much more problematic the promotion of population health through 
regulation of private life-style choices. Against this background, the promise of 
libertarian paternalism to greatly improve people’s health by making their every-
day decisions more healthy, without affecting their liberty, is rather spectacular. 
No moral or political argument is defended in this essay. Instead, the fo-
cus is on the concepts of paternalism and libertarian paternalism and how they can 
be understood in ways which are fruitful for moral and political debate, whatever 
one’s normative commitments. In particular, the focus is on the normativity of 
2  
 
these concepts – i.e. whether or not they are in themselves normative or non-
normative (descriptive), and in what sense.  
Moral and political debate typically takes place against a conceptual 
background that is taken for granted. Even technical terms such as paternalism and 
libertarian paternalism are often simply assumed to be clearly delimited and well 
understood. The truth is that these terms are used with different meanings in dif-
ferent contexts by different people. Anyone involved in evaluation of public health 
policy, whether to defend it to the public or question it in parliament or discuss the 
details of its proper implementation within some government agency or organiza-
tion, would do well to consider what the terms paternalism and libertarian pater-
nalism may most fruitfully mean, in order to better understand other people’s ar-
guments and in order to better formulate one’s own. By “better” here, I do not 
mean strategically efficient in the short term, but theoretically sound and so useful 
in promoting mutual understanding and honest debate. 
I will first provide a short background to the concepts of paternalism and 
libertarian paternalism as they have developed in the scholarly debate. I will then 
give an even shorter background on what I mean by normative concepts in this 
context. Next follows a more detailed discussion of the debate on the proper defi-
nition of paternalism, especially in terms of the normativity of the concept. This 
discussion, important in its own right, will then be used to shed light on the more 
recent concept of libertarian paternalism. Before concluding, I will provide two il-
lustrations to further clarify the different conceptual approaches surveyed. 
Background 
Much of contemporary philosophical debate on paternalism takes as its starting 
point John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. Mill did not himself use the term paternalism, 
but famously formulated the principle that ”the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.” (Chapter I, 9th paragraph) This principle has lat-
er become known as the harm principle.1 Interest in this aspect of Mill’s philoso-
phy was reignited by the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin over the 
relationship between law and morality and the proposal to decriminalize private 
homosexuality in the UK in the late 1950s. Hart (1963) made a point of distin-
guishing legal moralism – ”to enforce positive morality” – from paternalism – ”to 
protect individuals against themselves” (p. 31). Hart rejected moralism (and so 
Devlin’s rationale for keeping homosexuality criminalized), but accepted paternal-
                                                            
1 To be precise, the harm principle sometimes denotes the principle that we may interfere with 
liberty (or exercise power over someone against her will) in order to prevent harm to others, and 
sometimes the more ambitious principle that this is the only acceptable reason to interfere with 
liberty. 
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ism. His main argument for paternalism was that ”choices may be made or consent 
given without adequate reflection or appreciation of the consequences; or in pur-
suit of merely transitory desires; or in various predicaments when the judgment is 
likely to be clouded; or under psychological compulsion; or under pressure by 
others” (p. 33) As a result, Hart argued, people make choices that harm them, and 
when they do we should sometimes stop them for their own good.  
Our understanding of the many ways in which we are products of our en-
vironments have only deepened since Hart’s times. It is no coincidence that Joel 
Feinberg, Mill’s most distinguished follower in the 20th century, made voluntari-
ness a central concept in his critical treatment of paternalism. Feinberg was, in 
most of his writings, a fierce anti-paternalist, arguing that preventing harm to a 
person is normally not even a good reason for limiting her liberty, at least not by 
law (1971, 1986). However, Feinberg supported soft paternalism – the principle 
that the state may limit a person’s liberty for her own good when her conduct is 
insufficiently voluntary, or if intervention is needed to establish how voluntary it 
is (1986, p. 12). Feinberg went to great lengths to attempt to explain how volun-
tary is voluntary enough. His criteria include basic competence (not an infant or 
insane or comatose); absence of manipulation, coercion and duress; informedness; 
and absence of distorting circumstances (fatigue, agitation, passion, drugs, pain, 
neurosis, time pressure) (p. 115). When we fall under the threshold of sufficiently 
voluntary, we are not in tune with what Feinberg sometimes calls our ”true self”, 
and so restraining our non-voluntary actions is not really limiting our liberty. 
(1986, p. 12)  
Other authors have picked up and developed the idea of soft paternalism 
(e.g. Hodson 1977; VanDeVeer 1986) and it is now generally thought that such 
paternalism is compatible with a liberal normative outlook. Several authors argue 
that even hard paternalism – i.e. benevolent interference with voluntary choice, 
can be justified on a liberal basis if the motive is to secure the person’s long term 
liberty or autonomy (Dworkin 1972; Kleinig 1983; Sneddon 2001; Husak 2003), 
though with this Feinberg would certainly disagree, and probably Mill as well 
(though he famously rejected involuntary slavery as incompatible with the very 
idea of liberty). Feinberg was ambivalent about calling his position soft paternal-
ism, stating that he would have preferred ”soft anti-paternalism” if the competing 
term was not already well established (1986, p. 15-16).  
Libertarian paternalism, introduced in a 2003 article by Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein and discussed more widely since the publication of their book-
length defence in 2008 (new edition 2009), resembles soft paternalism in some 
ways. However, while soft paternalism is based on observations of well known 
obstacles to voluntary choice such as compulsion, lack of information and extreme 
emotions, libertarian paternalism is based on observations of more subtle psycho-
logical mechanisms. A large and growing body of research in psychology and be-
havioural economics shows that the decisions people make are heavily influenced 
by such seemingly irrelevant factors as what is the default alternative, how the al-
ternatives are described (framing), and even by obviously arbitrary comparison 
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points (anchoring). People also display apparently irrational preferences and be-
liefs such as a general preference for the status quo, aversion to losses relative to 
gains, unrealistic optimism, overconfidence, and regularly mistaking random pat-
terns for non-random ones (for an overview of this research, see Thaler and Sun-
stein 2009).  
In the spirit of soft paternalism, we might conclude that to the extent that 
decisions are affected by these psychological mechanisms, they are not truly our 
own and so can be overridden without interference with our liberty. However, this 
is not the conclusion drawn by the advocates of libertarian paternalism. Instead, 
they propose that since these psychological mechanisms affect what choices are 
made, we may as well make sure that they tend to promote physical, economical 
and mental well-being. This can be achieved by active design of the choice situa-
tion. The proponents argue that this does not limit our freedom to choose, since no 
alternative is blocked or removed and no one is forced to change her preferences. 
In sum, while based on similar observations about the deficiencies of human deci-
sion-making, soft and libertarian paternalism have quite different implications. 
Soft paternalism allows outright interference with insufficiently voluntary choice 
(including physical coercion and legal prohibitions). Libertarian paternalism al-
lows only active design of choice situations, which is allegedly not interfering at 
all.  
The connection between traditional anti-paternalism, soft paternalism and 
libertarian paternalism can also be highlighted by noting what view of the deci-
sion-maker and her preferences is linked with each approach. Mill mentions in 
passing that his principle is only intended to apply to people ”in the maturity of 
their faculties” (chapter I, 10th paragraph) or of ”the ordinary amount of under-
standing” (Chapter IV, 3d paragraph), but in the main disregarded the frailties of 
the human psyche, assuming that adults normally act on their settled preferences. 
Feinberg, in contrast, had a deep understanding of many of the ways in which we 
are affected by choice situations. However, he assumed in a Millian fashion that 
generally competent people have settled preferences which direct them to the ex-
tent that they are free from voluntariness-reducing circumstances. The point that 
Thaler and Sunstein have driven home is that because of the great impact of such 
things as default rules, starting points and framing effects, most of the time we 
simply have no preferences independently of the choice situations we face.  
Normative concepts  
There are many ways in which a concept can be normative. I propose that calling a 
concept normative most often means either of two things: First, a concept can be 
normatively relevant in the sense that whether or not something falls under this 
concept matters, to some degree, for what we ought to do or how things ought to 
be. This does not require that the concept is defined in normative terms. Whether 
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or not a concept is normatively relevant is context-dependent. For example, what 
gender someone belongs to is often not normatively relevant but it is relevant 
when accepting applications for an exclusive mentoring program for women (per-
haps set up to address structural inequality between the genders). Because of this 
context-dependence, it makes no sense to say quite generally that a concept is 
normatively relevant. I will, however, use the idea of non-normative concepts, 
meaning concepts that are almost never normatively relevant, though since there 
will always be at least hypothetical exceptions, the lack of normativity is really a 
matter of degree.  
Second, a concept can be normatively charged in the sense that whether 
or not something falls under the concept always counts for or always counts 
against doing that thing or being that way, if it counts at all. For example, the con-
cept of harming may be negatively normatively charged in the sense that if some-
thing is harming, that always counts against doing that thing or having things that 
way. The qualification “if it counts at all” is needed because on many normative 
theories some concerns have priority and so make other concerns irrelevant, even 
though these other concerns would typically be relevant. For example, on some 
moral theories, oath-breaking is absolutely forbidden. On such theories, if an ac-
tion both harms someone and means breaking an oath, then the action is forbidden 
just because it is an oath-breaking; the harming is irrelevant. Even on such theo-
ries, however, if harming is negatively charged it can never turn positive in the 
sense that it counts in favour of an action that it harms someone. In contrast, a 
concept that is merely normatively relevant may matter in different ways depend-
ing on the context. For example, that a person has a certain gender may obviously 
count either for or against treating her in some way, or be normatively neutral.  
A concept’s normativity is one of its properties. Establishing that a con-
cept is or is not non-normative or normatively charged is to restrict its domain 
along one dimension. It is not to give a precise definition, but it is to delimit what 
definitions may be correct. For an analogy, establishing that a chair is a functional 
object restricts what definitions may be correct: Correct definitions cannot cover 
chair-like objects constructed for display only. However, what is the correct pre-
cise definition of the concept chair is still an unsettled matter. Similarly, establish-
ing that paternalism is a negatively charged concept is not to give a precise defini-
tion, but it is to establish that correct definitions cannot cover behaviour that is 
morally unproblematic.  
In the following, I will investigate paternalism and libertarian paternalism 
as properties of actions or policies. Both concepts could alternatively be under-
stood as moral or political principles. Few people call themselves, or even others, 
“paternalists”, unless in a pejorative sense in the public debate. Paternalism is 
something you may accept, but it is not a political philosophy. Libertarian pater-
nalism, in contrast, is to some extent a political principle, that I have already com-
pared to the moral-political principles of anti-paternalism and soft paternalism. 
However, we may also say that a policy is libertarian paternalist, not in the sense 
that certain people endorse it, but in the sense that it has certain properties in and 
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of itself. It is in this non-principle sense that I will treat libertarian paternalism in 
the following. Policies are libertarian paternalist policies in virtue of their content 
or aims, people or political principles may perhaps be libertarian paternalists in a 
derived sense to the extent that they endorse such policies.  
While I talk throughout of normative and non-normative concepts rather 
than moral and non-moral, I will focus on normativity in the sense of moral rele-
vance and moral charge – i.e. relevance and charge related to moral oughts. 
The concept of paternalism 
For and against a non-normative approach 
In the contemporary debate on the adequate definition of paternalism, authors dis-
agree on whether or not the concept is normative, and in what sense. At one ex-
treme, Donald VanDeVeer (1986) considers it an advantage of his definition that 
paternalistic behaviour need not be morally problematic in any way (e.g. p. 35). 
His definition is, abbreviated, that behaviour is paternalistic if it aims to benefit a 
person contrary to her current preference, intention or disposition (p. 22). To ex-
emplify, people may prefer not to be told that their smoking is harmful and so 
providing this information for their benefit is paternalistic. However, if the infor-
mation is provided in a non-intrusive and neutral way, one may reasonably claim 
that such provision is not morally problematic. There are many cases in which pa-
ternalistic behaviour does raise moral issues, but, VanDeVeer argues, this is be-
cause it involves some presumptive wrong over and above the paternalism.  
VanDeVeer presents this argument in favour of his approach: ”If we wish 
to avoid begging the moral question (by simply assuming or supposing an act is 
wrong in labelling it ’paternalistic’) we need to identify a morally neutral defini-
tion” (pp. 16-17). This claim, however, is too strong. Even if paternalism is moral-
ly wrong by definition, we can still argue rationally about whether or not anything 
is paternalistic in this sense. The labelling can, in other words, involve much more 
than a simple assumption of wrongness. VanDeVeer points out that there are 
many value-laden terms in our language, exemplifying with a long line of pejora-
tive terms such as ‘bastard’ and ‘redneck’ (p. 16). However, there are also more 
theoretically interesting value-laden terms, such as ‘justice’ and ‘betrayal’. Even 
if, by definition, justice is good and betrayal is bad, this does not exhaust the dis-
cussion on these important concepts, nor does it necessarily beg any moral ques-
tions. 
Gerald Dworkin (2008) takes a less categorical stand in favour of a non-
normative approach, stating in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on 
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Paternalism that ”[a]s a matter of methodology it is preferable to see if some con-
cept can be defined in non-normative terms and only if that fails to capture the rel-
evant phenomena to accept a normative definition.” Dworkin presents no further 
argument for this position. I believe the standard rationale for preferring non-
normative definitions is a belief that it makes normative discussion more tidy and 
so more fruitful. If we can first, the thinking goes, agree on which things are 
which, we will then be in a better position to clarify our normative disagreements 
and perhaps even resolve them. Though this sounds reasonable, I propose that it is 
somewhat naive and not well suited to the issue at hand. 
Any definition of a moral-political concept is bound to be controversial. 
This goes for normative as well as non-normative definitions. Much discussion on 
the concept of paternalism appeals to linguistic intuitions. For example, in Bernard 
Gert and Charles Culver’s much quoted (1976) article on the definition of pater-
nalism, the authors list a number of cases that they take to be obvious examples of 
paternalism, presumably in force of the linguistic reactions we have to those cases, 
simply ‘feeling’ or ‘seeing’ that they must involve paternalism, quite independent-
ly of the clearly normative definition that the authors then present to accommodate 
the listed cases. Needless to say, these cases have led to much discussion and there 
is no sign that even proponents of non-normative definitions are about to agree on 
one. The preparatory establishment of a non-normative definition is never com-
pleted and so stands in the way of normative discussion rather than facilitating it.  
More to the point, the concept of paternalism is especially ill suited to 
non-normative definitions. We are interested in this concept precisely because of 
its alleged normative properties. Authors like Mill and Feinberg denounce pater-
nalism more or less categorically. It would be convenient if we could find a non-
normative description of the focus of their concern, but since this is embedded in 
values like liberty, autonomy, individuality and sovereignty, such a description 
would be hard to come by even under more favourable epistemic circumstances.  
Our linguistic intuitions may tempt us to regard some public health poli-
cies as paternalistic even though they are morally unproblematic. This fact seems 
to point in the direction of a non-normative concept. For example, the smoking in-
formation policy mentioned in connection with VanDeVeer’s definition above 
may seem paternalistic. Or, for a more private example, borrowed from Dworkin 
(2008), it may seem paternalistic for a dying person to bequeath money to a bene-
factor for use in a third person’s best interest, instead of bequeathing it directly to 
that person. However, linguistic intuitions are neither consistently shared, nor 
even consistent within each person’s linguistic universe. I would be prepared, for 
example, to count both these instances as non-paternalistic, though perhaps pater-
nalism-like in certain respects.  
As far as I can tell, ‘paternalism’ has no distinct descriptive meaning in 
everyday conversation, nor in some specialized field or profession. The etymology 
of the word (Latin pater for father) supports characterization along the lines of 
treating someone as a (good) father would treat a child. In moral and political dis-
cussions of paternalism, however, we are mainly interested in benevolent interfer-
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ence, not in material provision or other areas of parenthood. Paternalism is a term 
of art and we should define it to serve our purposes rather than our intuitions. The-
se purposes are, I propose, mainly to understand and critically evaluate the tradi-
tional liberal resistance to some forms of benevolent involvement in other peo-
ple’s lives.  
Like most authors, both Dworkin and VanDeVeer are mainly interested 
in the normative aspects of paternalism. While VanDeVeer strongly prefers a non-
normative conceptual approach, he devotes most of his investigation to those cases 
of paternalism that involve a “presumptive wrong”. Dworkin leaves it an open 
question whether or not his own analysis is normative, and proposes that we ”de-
cide upon an analysis based on a hypothesis of what will be most useful for think-
ing about a particular range of problems”. I propose that almost all such analyses 
will be normative in some sense, though there may be exceptions. 
For and against a normatively charged approach 
In the political debate, the term paternalism is often used in a pejorative sense - 
paternalism is assumed to be unacceptable, without further argument. It is perhaps 
this form of normative approach that inspires VanDeVeer’s critique. In the philo-
sophical and bioethical debate, a common approach is to assume, somewhat more 
cautiously, that paternalism is morally wrong unless certain conditions are ful-
filled (e.g. Dworkin 1972, Kleinig 1984). In public health ethics, a similar as-
sumption underlies several influential treatments of the justifiability of coercive 
public health measures, which are typically paternalistic, though not always de-
scribed using that term (e.g. Kass 2001, Upshur 2002, Childress et al., 2002).  
One way to understand this widespread assumption is in terms of the 
conceptual assumption that paternalism is negatively normatively charged. This 
means that the fact that, for example, a public health policy is paternalistic always 
counts against that policy (and this is part of what it means for the policy to be pa-
ternalistic). This is consistent with the possibility that some other property of the 
policy, such as its great benefits in terms of population health, outweighs the nega-
tive charge. 
Seana Shiffrin (2000) has more explicitly proposed what seems like a 
normatively charged definition of paternalism, arguing that “paternalist doctrines 
and policies convey a special, generally impermissible, insult to autonomous 
agents” (p. 208). One of the conditions in Shiffrin’s definition is that paternalistic 
behaviour towards a person B is “directed at B's own interests or matters that le-
gitimately lie within B's control” (p. 218). Despite the disjunctive formulation, B’s 
interests are supposed to be among the things that B should have control over. 
Therefore, paternalism always involves controlling what someone else should con-
trol, which seems morally wrong. Shiffrin does not, of course, claim that paternal-
ism is always morally wrong all things considered. Parts of her argument indi-
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cates, however, that the fact that some behaviour is paternalistic always counts 
against it, morally speaking (that paternalism is, as she says, “pro tanto morally 
problematic”) (p. 220, footnote 25). 
The normatively charged approach to paternalism rests on a strong com-
mitment to autonomy or some such liberal value. However, since paternalism is 
not merely an infringement of autonomy, if it even necessarily is such an in-
fringement, this background value is not sufficient to explain the negative charge. 
In fact, the normatively charged approach is seldom explicitly defended (Shiffrin 
is an exception).  
One advantage of the normatively charged approach is that it directs our 
attention towards the moral controversy involved in paternalism. However, as it 
stands this approach means that people who disagree on the moral status of pater-
nalism will disagree on the nature and even existence of paternalism. Those who 
find quite acceptable what Shiffrin and others call paternalism will have to claim 
that there exists no paternalism. This may often be conceptually impractical or 
confusing, especially when the assumption is implicit. It is also conceptually radi-
cal, since it implies that the substantial amount of authors who think that they 
think that paternalism is acceptable must be mistaken. 
Sometimes, paternalism is discussed as if Mill’s views, or some other set 
of liberal views, defined the very concept. This suggests that the normatively 
charged approach could be relativized in the sense that we take an essential prop-
erty of paternalism to be that it is held to be morally wrong by some relevant class 
of people. This approach would have the appealing consequence that talking about 
paternalism simply is talking about certain positions, which we may then endorse 
or dispute. As this is just what we normally do when we debate normative issues, 
there would be no separate question of the nature of paternalism. Notwithstanding 
this advantage, the approach is probably too subjective. In referring to Mill’s 
views, we typically suppose that Mill successfully identified something – paternal-
ism – which can be defined independently of his discovery or description. To al-
low the description to define what is described is to put the cart before the horse 
and implies for example that if Mill was inconsistent in his views, the concept it-
self is inconsistent. 
While both the objective and the subjective version of the normatively 
charged approach points our attention in the direction of an (alleged) moral wrong, 
they say very little about this wrong. Full understanding of the concept of pater-
nalism, on this conceptual approach, need not reveal anything about why it is (held 
to be) wrong, nor why many people find paternalism quite acceptable in many 
cases. The third approach I will consider is an attempt to provide more normative 
substance, without too radical and impractical conceptual consequences. 
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A value-focused approach 
Shiffrin is unusually thorough in explaining the particular moral wrong involved 
in paternalism, in terms of the insult it delivers to a person’s autonomous judg-
ment and agency. Such explication of values is at the heart of an alternative ap-
proach that I will call the value-focused conceptual approach. 
Unlike typical candidates for negatively normatively charged concepts, 
like cruelty, deception and unfairness, paternalism is almost universally thought to 
involve, essentially, the promotion of some good, or at least the honest intention to 
promote some good. Shiffrin’s definition is a notable exception to this norm. She 
is led to the normatively charged approach by her unorthodox position that pater-
nalism need involve no benevolence. On some other, libertarian-leaning accounts, 
the aim for good is thought of as a bad excuse, or as a further insult on top of the 
interference, with the assumption that no real good will come of it. Such under-
standings too fit nicely with a normatively charged definition. However, the most 
interesting ethical problems in this area arguably arise when the aim to benefit is 
effective or at least likely to be effective. From a policy perspective, policies that 
interfere with people’s liberty and do no good are obviously to be avoided, while 
policies that interfere with people’s liberty and promote their health or other inter-
ests raise difficult questions.  
Several contemporary definitions of paternalism try to capture the con-
flict between interference and benevolence. For example, David Archard (1990) 
proposes that the core of paternalism is “the usurpation of one person's choice of 
their own good by another”. According to Archard, this usurpation is not always 
even pro tanto morally wrong. It is rather that “we have duties to promote the 
well-being of others, but we also have a duty – at least on the standard anti-
paternalist account – to respect the choices of others.” (p. 41-42) In other words, 
paternalism involves a conflict between two duties and the justifiability of pater-
nalistic action and policy depends on how those two duties are balanced against 
each other.  
This points to a middle way between non-normative and normatively 
charged definitions. The concept of paternalism may essentially involve two con-
flicting duties or values, where one has to do with respect for liberty or autonomy, 
and the other has to do with promotion or protection of things like health, happi-
ness, security, financial wellbeing, or even achievement, self-fulfilment and other 
aspects of the good life quite generally.2 Indeed, the good can even include long 
term liberty and long term autonomy, which are threatened by the agent’s free and 
autonomous choice or action in the present. When this conflict is resolved in fa-
vour of overall good, or wellbeing, at the expense of present liberty, we have an 
                                                            
2 In the following, I will for simplicity talk only of values, and not of duties, with the assumption 
that ”value” may refer either to good things as such (which should be promoted according to var-
ious moral theories incorporating a consequentialist element), or to duties relative to these good 
things (figuring in deontological moral theories). 
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instance of paternalism. To denounce paternalism is to hold that such conflicts 
should never be resolved in that way. The concept as such, however, carries nei-
ther a positive nor a negative charge. 
The value-focused approach clearly distinguishes paternalism from other 
normative concepts. Various proposed definitions can now be interpreted as at-
tempts to capture more precisely the nature of the values which conflict, as well as 
the way in which they conflict. Two values conflict in an objective sense when 
they cannot both be realized or fulfilled. In this objective sense, paternalism is the 
promotion of good at the expense of liberty, regardless of anyone’s thoughts, in-
tentions or feelings. Most authors hold that paternalism must involve a motive or 
intention to promote good at the expense of liberty. This means the conflict is 
more subjective or intentional. Arguably, evaluation of laws and policies should 
more often be focused on objective effects, while evaluation of behaviour may 
perhaps be focused on motives and intentions. The value-focused approach can 
accommodate both of these varieties (as can the normatively charged approach).  
For a very subjective take on the conflict of values, we could say that it is 
paternalism if someone attempts to promote what she thinks is a person’s good, by 
limiting that person’s freedom, even if she does not in fact do any good. It could 
also be paternalism if, conversely, someone promotes a person’s good by means 
which she thinks limits the person’s freedom, even if it does not in fact do so. 
Somewhat surprisingly, it is almost standard practice to define paternalism along 
these lines. Both VanDeVeer’s and Archard’s explicit definitions say that pater-
nalism involves interference only in the sense that the agent believes that she will 
act contrary to the person’s preference (VanDeVeer) or diminish her choice (Ar-
chard), regardless of whether or not she actually does so (another influential ex-
ample is Gert and Culver 1976). However, I believe that this is a weakness of the-
se definitions, which should be corrected. Some of the surrounding discussion 
suggests that VanDeVeer and Archard think that paternalistic behaviour must at 
least aim to do something which is in fact interfering (as opposed to something 
that is completely innocuous but that the agent in her possibly confused state of 
mind dreams up to be interfering). However, I propose that even such slightly less 
subjective paternalism, when completely ineffective, is irrelevant for the evalua-
tion of public policy. 
If anyone should hold that liberty is not a value, she must, if the value-
focused approach is accepted, claim that there exists no paternalism. This might 
seem to lead to the same radical and impractical terminology that I said would fol-
low from the normatively charged approach objectively understood. However, 
most people do find liberty valuable, even though they may find other values more 
important.3 Those who insist that liberty is not even a rather trivial value are cer-
tainly fewer than those who insist that paternalism is sometimes morally right. The 
                                                            
3 I assume that utilitarians can hold, with Mill, that liberty is a value, instrumental to utility or an 
aspect of utility. 
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value-based approach, therefore, will not confuse or limit our normative language 
to the same extent as the objective normatively charged approach.  
It is possible to hold that wellbeing has no value, I suppose, though this 
seems very exotic. Authors who are opposed to government benevolence typically 
believe either that such benevolence does no good, or that what good it does is 
outweighed by accompanying bads. Of course, the first group of authors often 
want to label alleged but ineffective wellbeing-promoting government activities 
“paternalism”. This is not possible on the value-focused approach, since such ac-
tivities do not involve any positive value. In this sense, the value-focused ap-
proach is radical – policies that are trivially undesirable because they have no pos-
itive effects are not paternalistic. This is an immediate and unavoidable 
consequence of delimiting the concept to what is arguably the normative core of 
paternalism – the conflict between on the one hand respect for liberty and auton-
omy and on the other hand the protection and promotion of wellbeing. There can 
be such a conflict only if there is something for liberty to be in conflict with. I 
propose that limiting the use of “paternalism” in this way does not cause much 
conceptual confusion, but merely deprives critics of misconceived government 
policy of a theoretically-sounding pejorative term. 
 
The concept of libertarian paternalism 
The concept of paternalism has been formed over a long period of time as part of 
the process of understanding the conflict between individual liberty and benevo-
lence, and the traditional liberal insistence that the former take priority. In con-
trast, the term libertarian paternalism was introduced in an academic article in 
2003. The authors, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, present libertarian paternal-
ism both as a political position or principle and as a form of policy strategy. The 
strategy, as noted above, is focused on exploiting predictable human biases and 
other irrational tendencies to design choice situations in ways that promote wise 
choices. This strategy seems both practically useful (as indicated by the interest at 
the highest levels of government both in the US and in the UK) and philosophical-
ly interesting (as indicated by the academic interest among legal scholars, econo-
mists and, more recently, philosophers). Since Thaler and Sunstein do little to 
specify the concept of libertarian paternalism, and since many of their examples 
seem to contradict what they do say in the way of specification, the concept is ra-
ther open to interpretation. This is of course potentially problematic, as people de-
bate the strategy with no clear view of what it is. As possible remedies, I will now 
consider how the three conceptual strategies that have been proposed for under-
standing paternalism may be applied to libertarian paternalism. 
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The non-normative approach 
Like paternalism, libertarian paternalism is very much a political-philosophical 
concept, to be used in normative, political debate. Just as with paternalism, how-
ever, we may consider whether the concept as such is normative or non-normative. 
According to Thaler and Sunstein, libertarian paternalism is paternalism in the 
sense that ”it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties in a way that 
will make choosers better off.” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1162; cf Thaler and 
Sunstein 2009 p. 5) It is libertarian in the sense that it aims to ensure that ”people 
should be free to opt out of specified arrangements if they choose to do so.” (2003, 
p. 1161; cf 2009 p. 5) The possibility to opt out is said to ”preserve freedom of 
choice” (2003, p. 1182) – i.e. to be ”liberty-preserving” (2009, p. 5). This can be 
understood non-normatively: That an action or policy aims at improvement and 
ensures opt-out possibilities need not be either morally problematic or morally be-
nign. 
I argued above that a non-normative approach is ill suited to the concept 
of paternalism, because this concept is strongly tied to traditional liberal de-
nouncement. Something of the opposite is true for libertarian paternalism. The 
strategy is put forth as a non-intrusive and therefore unproblematic form of benev-
olent policy-making. I will discuss this claim and some critique below in consider-
ing a value-focused approach. However, I propose that what makes libertarian pa-
ternalism interesting is to a large extent the novel strategies proposed for 
influencing choice by non-rational means, that is by exploiting (in a non-
pejorative sense) people’s biases, misconceptions and predictable, irrational re-
sponses to irrelevant aspects of choice situations. Luc Bovens (2009, p. 209) simi-
larly proposes as one defining characteristic of libertarian paternalism that ”some 
pattern of irrationality is being exploited”4. Thaler and Sunstein often have a wider 
focus than this, recommending all sorts of policies that will improve choices, in-
cluding providing relevant information (which for Mill and others is paradigmati-
cally non-paternalistic). However, it is the non-rational influencing that is more 
novel and typical of the strategy. A possible non-normative understanding of liber-
tarian paternalism, therefore, is ’benevolent non-rational influence’, or perhaps, 
more narrowly, benevolent non-rational influence that does not make any alterna-
tive inaccessible or too difficult to pick – i.e. ’mild benevolent non-rational influ-
ence’.5 
The meaning of ”benevolent” here is ambiguous. We know from the de-
bate on the definition of paternalism that it is notoriously difficult to determine 
                                                            
4 Bovens mostly talks of ”nudge” rather than ”libertarian paternalism” but means the same thing 
by these terms. 
5 This is perhaps still too wide, since it would seem to include subliminal advertising, which Tha-
ler and Sunstein reject (2009, p. 247). In rejecting subliminal influence, Thaler and Sunstein re-
fers to what they call a publicity condition, which would exclude “invisible” manipulation. Per-
haps some such transparancy condition should complement the non-normative specification. 
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even in the abstract whether a policy aims to benefit only the people directly tar-
geted, or also others, and if so to what degree. Libertarian paternalism could either 
inherit this difficulty, or the restriction to the chooser’s interests could simply be 
dropped, allowing that the benevolence could be directed at anybody, the chooser 
and/or others. Though Thaler and Sunstein say the strategy aims at making choos-
ers themselves better off, some of their policy proposals (such as presumed con-
sent to organ donation (2009, p. 179)) are aimed exclusively at benefiting other 
people than the targeted choosers. One reason to keep the distinction, however, is 
that some authors find it more morally problematic to influence choice for the sa-
ke of the chooser. This is not to allow this alleged moral problem to define the 
concept, but simply to delimit the concept non-normatively in order to simplify 
normative debate. If we go ahead and drop the restriction to the chooser’s inter-
ests, of course, the term ”paternalism” is arguably less appropriate (though as not-
ed Shiffrin’s definition does not include benevolence).  
What is the point of a non-normative concept of libertarian paternalism? 
It may be to point out certain public health strategies that are salient because they 
have not been properly recognized and so not properly utilized, or because they 
are likely to be politically feasible, in contrast to other strategies. Whether or not 
such strategies are morally acceptable is, on this approach, another matter.  
The value-focused approach 
While one virtue of Thaler and Sunstein’s writings is their detailed treatment of 
concrete techniques for constructing choice situations (nudging techniques), they 
clearly focus on these techniques because of their potential to promote wellbeing 
(including health) without limiting freedom of choice. The claim that libertarian 
paternalism does not limit freedom of choice is what makes it so politically attrac-
tive. This claim has been challenged in several ways. However, a possible concep-
tual approach to libertarian paternalism is to take the claim seriously and accept 
that policies that do limit freedom of choice are not in fact libertarian paternalist. 
Likewise, we may accept the claim that libertarian paternalism promotes wellbe-
ing, or at least that it aims to do so.6  
These assumptions amount to a form of value-focused understanding of 
the concept, though not in this case in terms of a conflict. Libertarian paternalism 
is, on this conceptual approach, essentially the combination of a promotion of 
good (by avoiding harm or providing benefit) and the absence of an interference 
with freedom or liberty (at least in terms of choice). Just as with paternalism, these 
two sides may appear on different levels of intentionality – they may be intentions 
                                                            
6 Thaler and Sunstein defend no particular idea of what wellbeing consists in, 
but rather refer to people’s considered judgment, assuming that people typically 
prefer to live long and be healthy. 
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only, effects only, or effective intentions. It is libertarian paternalism in a motive 
sense to aim to promote wellbeing without limiting liberty. It is libertarian pater-
nalism in an effect sense to actually do so. The approach can accommodate these 
varieties, though as with paternalism, motives without effects are hardly relevant 
for the evaluation of public policy. 
In the case of paternalism, the value-focused approach in and of itself dis-
tinguishes the concept from other concepts. The value-focused approach to liber-
tarian paternalism, in contrast, includes all forms of non-interfering benevolence, 
including providing help upon request. This category of actions is better described 
simply as non-interfering or non-paternalistic benevolence. Even if it sometimes 
seems that Thaler and Sunstein are in fact talking about this wide category, it 
would be pointless to attach a new term to this existing concept, except for rhetor-
ical reasons. If libertarian paternalism is to be an original concept, it needs some 
additional non-normative content. 
One such possibility is to restrict the concept to non-rational influence, 
thereby picking out a subclass of non-interfering benevolence. The point of this 
might be similar to what could motivate a purely non-normative approach, only 
now coupled with the specification that the non-rational influence in question is 
liberty-preserving. This is to make a normative claim and to back this claim up 
with a non-normative specification. This is arguably what Thaler and Sunstein in-
tend to do to the extent that they focus on non-rational influence. This approach is 
controversial, raising the question whether or not any policy can be libertarian pa-
ternalist in this sense.  
I have called this approach value-focused because it is focused on partic-
ular values – wellbeing and liberty, and a particular relationship between them. 
However, if this relationship means that one positive value is promoted, with no 
ensuing disvalue, then the concept is at the same time positively normatively 
charged, since being libertarian paternalist always counts in favour of a policy. 
With the hybrid approach, as with the non-normative approach, the ques-
tion arises of whether or not to keep the restriction to promoting the chooser’s 
good in particular. If this restriction is dropped, the term ”paternalism” is even less 
appropriate on this approach than on the non-normative approach, since there is by 
definition no limitation of liberty, which is an essential property of paternalism on 
most accounts. On the other hand, the term may be motivated because it refers to 
influencing techniques that are typically liberty-limiting, though not in this case, 
or that are relevantly similar to techniques which are liberty-limiting. 
An alternative to the hybrid approach is to look to more specific or nar-
row liberal values that may be diminished by libertarian paternalist policies even if 
these do not restrict freedom in the sense of blocking out alternatives or making 
them prohibitively costly. Because libertarian paternalist polices do not engage the 
rational processes of their targets, but rather exploit shortcomings of rationality, 
they may be considered manipulative and/or an aggressive substitution of the 
chooser’s judgment for that of the policy-maker. For example, Mark White (2010) 
argues that intentionally structuring choice situations in order to promote the pre-
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sumed interests of choosers is manipulative in a way that neither structuring 
choice situations randomly or structuring them to further one’s own self-interest 
is. Bovens (2009) suggests that libertarian paternalism may prevent the building of 
moral character and decrease people’s sense of personal responsibility (pp. 214-
15). If paternalism essentially involves some such disvalue, a value-focused ap-
proach that more closely resembles the conflict of values characteristic of pater-
nalism proper would be appropriate. However, since critics and proponents disa-
gree on the merits of these charges, and since this is a main division in the 
political debate on libertarian paternalism, this strategy is probably too confusing. 
Some critics, such as White, argue not only that libertarian paternalism 
has its costs, but, much more strongly, that it has no benefits. Governments can do 
nothing to improve the wellbeing of their populations through libertarian paternal-
ist policies, these critics claim. White, for example, believes that there is no way to 
know what a person prefers unless she has explicitly stated her preference or acted 
on it, and that there is no way to benefit a person unless we know what she pre-
fers. Since libertarian paternalism does not even aim to satisfy such explicit pref-
erences, it can yeild no benefits. Proponents are mistaken, White seems to say, in 
simply assuming that most people are better off alive and in good health. This 
view is obviously rather extreme. My point is only that if benevolence is not de-
sirable, for whatever reason, and manipulation is always undesirable to some ex-
tent, then libertarian paternalism is morally wrong and so the concept is negatively 
normatively charged.  
 Since libertarian paternalism is a new concept and less integral to our 
moral and political world views than paternalism, a charged concept is less prob-
lematic than in the case of paternalism.If, for example, we decide that libertarian 
paternalism is morally unproblematic by definition, critics may deny that there is 
such a thing as libertarian paternalism without too much linguistic confusion. 
In sum, a value-focused approach to libertarian paternalism can either 
combine non-interference and good-promotion, which requires some further non-
normative content to form an original concept, or combine good-promotion and 
some controversial disvalue such as manipulation. Either strategy can lead to a 
normatively charged concept, if it entails the realization of a positive value only, 
or a disvalue only. 
While Thaler and Sunstein have a tendency to include everything they 
like under the concept of libertarian paternalism, they seem, when they focus on 
the concept itself, to have in mind the hybrid positively charged approach. Liber-
tarian paternalism is, on this approach, ‘morally unproblematic mild benevolent 
non-rational influence’, where at least “mild” may need some further specifica-
tion. 
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A terminological note on libertarianisms 
As noted above, Thaler and Sunstein consider the term libertarian appropriate be-
cause the strategy preserves freedom of choice. However, the strategy is aimed at 
improving welfare, an aim that libertarians typically think is inappropriate for the 
government. There are many other aims that could inform how choices are influ-
enced by non-rational means. For example, Gregory Mitchell (2004) has suggest-
ed that a truly libertarian paternalism would permit influencing choice only in or-
der to either improve decision-making competence by various debiasing 
techniques, or to prevent liberty-restricting irrational choices, but not to improve 
the chooser’s general welfare (p. 20). Alternatively, one could aim to maximize 
autonomy or liberty in some sense, perhaps in the form of self-reliance, or to pro-
mote a libertarian life-style of non-interference with others. Any of these strategies 
would arguably better deserve the name libertarian paternalism.  
As a terminological matter, therefore, the term libertarian paternalism is 
unfortunate. We must accept that our terminology is typically determined not by 
the desirability of theoretical clarity, but by contingent social and political events. 
Perhaps, however, it is not too late to change the term libertarian paternalism. Tha-
ler and Sunstein put less emphasis on it in their book than in their earlier articles. 
In the book they talk more about nudging and choice architecture, which are 
stronger candidates for non-normative concepts (choice architecture may refer to 
all circumstances of a choice, or to those which have a non-rational influence; 
nudging is changing or shaping the choice architecture). This suggests the possi-
bility of abandoning the very concept of libertarian paternalism and speak only of 
nudging and choice architecture. Some of the conceptual investigation in this 
chapter may be relevant for investigating these related concepts, but not all.  
Illustrations 
The conceptual approaches I have discussed can be applied to most moral and po-
litical concepts. Concepts can be non-normative, normatively charged or value-
focused (where the two latter approaches partly overlap). Which approach one 
adopts naturally determines what one means when one uses the corresponding 
terms. I will now illustrate this by way of two examples, one for each concept. 
Taxing fat in food – a paternalistic policy? 
At the time of writing, it seems likely that Denmark will soon introduce a special 
tax on consumption of fat in food products. Similar measures are discussed in oth-
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er countries. If someone claims that such a tax would be paternalistic, she may be 
giving a non-normative description, for example claiming in the spirit of 
VanDeVeer that the measure is aimed at providing benefits and preventing harms, 
but that it is contrary to people’s preferences (VanDeVeer does not discuss group 
cases so the person would have to look elsewhere to find a reasonable specifica-
tion of what she means by ”people’s”). Neither one of these properties necessarily 
makes the measure either good or bad. Though the benevolent aim is typically 
held to count in favour of the measure and the resistance against it, whether or not 
they actually do so depends on what is the correct moral and political theory. The 
categorization of the measure as paternalistic says nothing about this, nor about 
the appropriateness of the measure.  
It is somewhat obscure why this person would make this statement, un-
less she thought that the mentioned properties of the tax were indeed morally rele-
vant. She may of course wish to point out that the tax has these properties, which 
other people may find morally relevant, without any normative commitments of 
her own. However, there are certainly other properties that people may find moral-
ly relevant too, and so one is left with the suspicion that the person does find these 
particular properties especially relevant. 
Now, another person may claim that the same fat tax is paternalistic, but 
mean by this, among other things, that the measure is morally wrong considering 
its immediate costs and benefits. This means that unless the tax is justified by fac-
tors unrelated to paternalism (such as raising funds necessary for the operation of 
the government), and unless this tax for some reason avoids a major catastrophe 
(larger than just saving thousands of anonymous life years by improving popula-
tion health), then the tax is morally wrong all things considered. This second per-
son’s categorization of the measure as paternalistic implies a moral claim in addi-
tion to the conceptual assumption. We can therefore disagree with her in several 
distinct ways. If we accept her terminology but reject her moral claim we must say 
that the tax is not in fact paternalistic. Alternatively, we may object to both her 
terminology and her moral claim, insisting that though the tax is paternalistic, this 
does not mean that it is wrong. Less typically, we may accept her moral claim but 
reject her terminology, which leaves it an open question whether we agree that the 
measure is paternalistic, though we agree that it is wrong. 
A third person may call the fat tax paternalistic in order to point out that 
it involves a cost in terms of liberty and a likely gain in terms of population health, 
giving rise to a value conflict. In other words, the categorization can help focus 
our attention on factors relevant for moral evaluation. If we accept this terminolo-
gy but wish to deny that both of these values are involved in this particular case, 
we can object that the person is mistaken, because the tax is not paternalistic. If 
we reject the terminology, we may or may not agree that implementing it involves 
a conflict of values. 
Needless to say, a debate between these three people over a proposed tax 
on fat in foods would likely be very confusing unless they recognized their differ-
ences in terminology. Sometimes one may accept whatever terminology one is 
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confronted with, in order to avoid conceptual disagreement and be able to focus on 
more important matters. However, this strategy can actually be confusing, since 
we expect normative and conceptual matters to be intertwined in moral and politi-
cal debate. This strategy also presupposes that one is aware of what terminology 
one is confronted with, which is often opaque. Therefore, there may be no way 
around making explicit what one takes others to mean by some term, before agree-
ing to that use for present purposes, or declaring how one will use it instead. For 
most purposes, including the fat tax, I believe the value-focused approach of the 
third person is most conducive to fruitful moral and political debate. 
Regulating display of food – a libertarian paternalist strategy? 
While the term ”paternalism” is used rather frequently in moral and political dis-
cussions, “libertarian paternalism” was recently introduced and it remains to be 
seen whether it will become an established concept or prove more temporary. 
More than in the case of paternalism, therefore, it is important to ask whether call-
ing anything by this term provides a meaningful and useful categorization (though 
this may certainly be asked also in the case of paternalism proper). 
In their book, Thaler and Sunstein introduce the libertarian paternalism 
strategy with the story of a (hypothetical) director of food services for a large city 
school system who realizes that the order and manner in which food is displayed 
in the cafeterias of her schools will have a large influence on what the students eat. 
The cafeteria case is also emphasized in both their 2003 articles (Sunstein and 
Thaler 2003, Thaler and Sunstein 2003) and is frequently considered a paradig-
matic case of libertarian paternalism. It would not be difficult to instruct directors 
of public schools to implement healthy display plans, without changing what al-
ternatives are offered. In fact, this policy could include all public workplaces 
where cafeterias are run by the organization (as opposed to independent entrepre-
neurs). Going more comprehensive, it would not be difficult to encourage healthy 
food display by private businesses. For example, the government could issue cer-
tificates for participating restaurants (and why not supermarkets) and this certifi-
cate could be publically marketed as a sign of health awareness and social respon-
sibility (or certificates could entail tax exemptions though this would arguably be 
less libertarian). 
What could be the point of calling this form of public health policy liber-
tarian paternalism? First, it could be a non-normative claim, implying that the pol-
icy would amount to mild benevolent non-rational influence on people’s food 
choices, or rather the encouragement of such influencing. Second, it could be a 
hybrid claim, implying that while the policy would amount to mild benevolent 
non-rational influence, this would not limit people’s freedom to choose food as 
they like. If the expected health benefits are a positive and there are no other nega-
tives directly associated with the policy, this is claiming that the policy is desira-
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ble, and to be implemented. More generally, if all libertarian paternalism is similar 
in this respect, the concept as such is positively normatively charged. Third, the 
point of calling the healthy display policy libertarian paternalism could be to point 
out a value conflict between on the one hand promotion of population health, and 
on the other the ensuing disvalue of manipulation, or perhaps some other similar 
disvalue. If there is such a disvalue and if the promotion of population health (by 
the government) is inappropriate or impossible, then this is to claim that the policy 
is undesirable. More generally, all libertarian paternalism is undesirable and so the 
concept is negatively normatively charged. 
 I believe all three approaches may have good uses in moral and political 
debate. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, we should ideally have more than 
one concept. The first use may perhaps be called “nudging”, which sounds less 
normative than “libertarian paternalism”. The third could simply be called “pater-
nalism”, or the name of some other value conflict depending on what value one 
takes to be compromised. The term “libertarian paternalism”, if it should be used 
at all, should be reserved for the second use, which is more novel and most in line 
with the intentions of its originators. 
Conclusion 
Modern anti-paternalists are typically what Joel Feinberg called soft paternalists, 
which means they denounce paternalism only when directed towards sufficiently 
voluntary behaviour, unless the aim is to make sure that such behaviour is indeed 
sufficiently voluntary. In the spirit of soft paternalism, the insight that our choices 
are strongly influenced by irrelevant details of choice situations could warrant be-
nevolent interference with such choices. As a political principle, libertarian pater-
nalism instead only sanctions actively designing choice situations so that they tend 
to produce wise choices, without restricting available alternatives.  
I have argued that paternalism is a strongly normative concept, intimately 
linked with the traditional liberal denouncement of various types of benevolent in-
volvement in other people’s lives, especially by the government. Since there are 
no inherent problems with normative concepts, it is best to accept a normative def-
inition of paternalism. A normatively charged definition may have its advantages, 
but in general a value-focused definition will be more informative and less confus-
ing. A precise value-focused definition will say something about in what sense a 
person’s liberty (or autonomy or some similar liberal value) is diminished by pa-
ternalism, and in what sense her other interests are promoted. 
I have argued that there are several fruitful ways to understand the new 
concept of libertarian paternalism. These should be distinguished and preferably 
used under different names, though I do not expect convergence in either concep-
tual approaches or terminology. A non-normative definition could be fruitful be-
cause it points to a form of influence that has not been widely used in public 
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health work, at least not in its full width, but that could be very useful and could 
be acceptable because it is effective while relatively mild. A value-focused defini-
tion could be very useful because it captures the moral and political controversy 
the program has stirred. A hybrid positively charged definition is arguably what 
Thaler and Sunstein comes closest to endorsing. This may be fruitful in identify-
ing useful public health measures which are morally unproblematic, if there are 
any such measures. 
Acknowledgments   Thanks to Stephen John, Verina Wild, Niklas Möller, Angus Dawson, the 
editors and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. The author is a COFAS Marie Curie 
Fellow with financial support from the European Commission and the Swedish Council for 
Working Life and Social Research.  
References 
Archard, D. (1990). Paternalism defined. Analysis 50(1), 36-42. 
Bovens, L. The ethics of nudge. (2008). In T. Grüne-Yanoff and S.O. Hansson (Eds.) Preference 
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